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ABSTRACT 
Salah satu karakteristik penting dari pasar kredit mikro di negara sedang berkembang 
(NSB) adalah tingginya derajat ketidaksempurnaan informasi yang pada gilirannya 
menyebabkan tingginya derajat risiko dan ketidakpastian. Tulisan ini mengungkapkan 
bahwa lembaga keuangan mikro di NSB telah menerapkan praktik-praktik pengelolaan 
yang unik dan beraneka ragam yang berbasiskan pada institusi-institusi informal seperti 
norma dan sanksi sosial dalam upayanya untuk memecahkan masalah risiko dalam 
memberikan kredit pada pasar kredit mikro. Praktik-praktik pengelolaan tersebut — yang 
berakarkan pada institusi informal yang ada — telah berhasil mengurangi risiko kredit 
yang dicerminkan oleh kemampuan dari praktik pengelolaan tersebut dalam menurunkan 
kredit macet, khususnya dalam sebuah masyarakat yang homogen dengan nilai transaksi 
ekonomi yang relatif kecil. Namun demikian, ketika suatu masyarakat berkembang menjadi 
relatif heterogen dan transaksi ekonominya semakin besar, efektivitas institusi informal 
tersebut menurun. Dalam kondisi seperti ini, kehadiran institusi formal menjadi suatu 
keharusan.  
Keywords: microfinance institutions, risk, uncertainty, and informal institutions 
 
INTRODUCTION
1
 
A microfinance or microcredit institution 
is generally characterised by a collage of 
dynamic, innovative, and flexible 
arrangements that are tailored to the local 
economic and social environment (Adams & 
Fitchett, 1992). The institution is a complex 
phenomenon that has economic and socio-
cultural dimensions. Using a literature survey 
method this paper attempts to discuss credit 
risk faced by microfinance institutions and 
how to cope with the risk in order to have a 
good performance and sustainable. This paper 
starts with the definition, characteristics, and 
                                                          
1  Many great thanks go to R. Agus Sartono from Gadjah 
Mada University and Susanne Schech from Flinders 
Univerity that have made extremely helpful comments.  
practical arrangement of microfinance 
institutions in developing countries. The 
second part discusses some theories on the 
relationship between imperfect information 
and credit markets. The third part discusses the 
role of institutions, with emphasis on informal 
institutions, in overcoming the risk problem in 
rural credit market in developing countries. 
The last part is concluding remarks. 
DEFINITION AND CHARACTERISTICS 
OF MICROFINANCE INSTITUTIONS  
The definitions of microfinance 
institutions proposed by some scholars and 
organisation are seemingly different from one 
to another. However, the essence of the 
definitions is usually the same in which 
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microfinance refers to the provision of 
financial services, primarily savings and credit 
but also other financial services, to poor and 
low-income households that do not have 
access to commercial banks.  
According to Ledgerwood (1999, p.1), the 
term microfinance refers to the provision of 
financial services (generally savings and 
credit) to low-income clients. The clients are 
often identified as traders, street vendors, small 
farmers, service providers (hairdressers, 
rickshaw drivers), and artisans and small 
producers, such as blacksmiths and 
seamstresses. She points out that many such 
clients have a stable source of income since 
they have multiple sources of income. 
Although they are poor, they are generally not 
considered to be “the poorest of the poor.”  
The Asian Development Bank (ADB) 
defines microfinance as the provision of a 
broad range of financial services such as 
deposits, loans, payment services, money 
transfers, and insurance to poor and low-
income households and their micro-enterprises 
(ADB, 2000, p.6). The ADB definition 
includes low income households as well as 
those below the poverty line since there are a 
significant number of low-income households 
that are not below the poverty line, but have 
limited access to financial services, especially 
in rural areas. 
Robinson (2001, p.9) points out that the 
term microfinance refers to small-scale 
financial services, primarily credit and savings, 
provided to people who farm or fish or herd; 
who operate small enterprises or micro-
enterprises where goods are produced, 
recycled, repaired, or sold; who provide 
services; who work for wages and 
commissions; who gain income from renting 
out small amounts of land, vehicles, draft 
animals, or machinery and tools; and other 
individuals and groups at the local levels of 
developing countries, both rural and urban 
area. A slightly different definition is 
formulated by Meagher (2002). He suggests 
that microfinance is lending small amounts of 
money for short periods with frequent 
repayments (Meagher, 2002, p.7). Concerning 
the definition of microfinance institution, 
Meagher (2002) argues that as a general 
principle, it is important to provide a definition 
that will enable market participants to be 
responsible, energetic, and innovative. The 
legal definition should be broad enough both to 
enable a focus on a sensible target group and to 
provide a wide range of appropriate financial 
services for that group. 
In practice, some microfinance institutions 
provide social intermediation services such as 
group formation, development of self-
confidence, and training in financial literacy 
and management capabilities among members 
of a group that intended to benefit low-income 
women and men (Bennett, 1998, Ledgerwood, 
1999). Part of the reasons is because low-
income people face strong barriers (such as 
illiteracy, gender discrimination, and 
remoteness) in trying to gain access to ordinary 
financial service institutions (Ledgerwood, 
1999, p.63). This means that the skills and 
confidence of low-income people have to be 
developed in addition to credit provision. 
Therefore, the microfinance approach is not a 
minimalist approach that offering only 
financial intermediation but an integrated 
approach offering both financial 
intermediation and other services mentioned 
above (Ledgerwood, 1999, p.65). It can also 
then be expected to reduce poverty and to 
develop and strengthen the institutional 
capacity of local financial systems through 
finding ways to cost-effectively lend money to 
poor households (Ledgerwood, 1999, 
Morduch, 1999, Morduch, 2000, Otero, 1999, 
Snow, 1999).  
As noted in the introduction, Adams & 
Fitchett (1992) point out that microfinance 
institutions are generally characterised by a 
collage of dynamic, innovative, and flexible 
arrangements that are tailored to the local 
economic and social environment. They argue 
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that these arrangements are resilient and that 
many of them have grown over a long period 
(Adams & Fitchett, 1992, p.3). This flexibility 
is accorded by the limited regulation, along 
with smallness of size, with most microfinance 
institutions operating in a circumscribed area, 
or in a specific niche of the market where 
personal knowledge of borrowers is possible 
(Ghate, 1988). The type of transaction is small 
and short-term transactions, which are based 
on personal relationships or the institution’s 
intimate knowledge of its clientele (Wai, 
1992), and which usually occur close to where 
clients live, shop, or work. To facilitate the 
clients’ entry, microfinance institutions also 
apply a simple application procedures and 
loans are disbursed quickly (ADB, 2000). The 
interest rates charged by microfinance 
institutions are market-oriented and intended to 
cover both their operational and financial 
costs, based on the assumption that the poor 
are willing to pay for access and convenience. 
To sum up, Wai argues that these 
arrangements are flexible, adapt to economic 
change, innovative, involve low transaction 
costs for both lender and borrower, and result 
in high loan recovery rates (Wai, 1992, p.340). 
Regarding the transaction costs, a study in 
India lists four characteristics that explain why 
microfinance institutions exhibit lower 
transaction costs than modern banks (Ghate, 
1992b, Timberg & Aiyar, 1984, p.44, 54). 
First, the microfinance institutions know their 
clients better than commercial banks. The 
lender has had adequate information on the 
borrower through previous credit transactions, 
or through community and neighbourhood ties. 
This reduces their information costs compared 
to those of commercial banks. Second, 
administrative costs are lower for microfinance 
institutions than for commercial banks because 
microfinance institutions’ employees are paid 
less (and are less educated), the establishment 
is less elaborate, and the paperwork simpler 
than for commercial banks. Third, the interest 
rates of microfinance institutions are not 
regulated and therefore it can be adjusted fully 
to market forces. Non-price competition is 
thereby kept down to an optimum level. 
Fourth, microfinance institutions are not 
subject to the reserve requirements that are 
imposed on modern banks.  
IMPERFECT INFORMATION AND 
CREDIT MARKETS  
As discussed in the previous sections, 
most microfinance institutions are located in 
rural areas and characterised by poor clients, 
who take out small loans, often with no 
collateral, and a simple and quick procedure. 
The credit mechanism is flexible and tailored 
to the socio-economic conditions of local 
people. This mechanism is mainly aimed to 
reduce credit risk (default) by delinquent 
clients, which could have negative effects on 
the financial performance and sustainability of 
the institutions. This section discusses some 
theories on the relationship between risk 
problem and rural credit market.  
In an idealised credit market, credit is 
traded through competitive markets where 
supply and demand forces interact and the 
interest rate is determined through supply and 
demand (Besley, 1994, p.29). In the absence of 
externalities, competitive markets tend to reach 
a state of equilibrium (i.e., a state where no 
participant in the market can improve his/her 
position without making the position of some 
other participant worse). Besley points out that 
exchanges (Pareto improvements) will take 
place in the market until final equilibrium has 
been reached. When all Pareto improvements 
have been made, the market is said to have 
reached a Pareto optimum
2
, where maximum 
efficiency is achieved. A Pareto optimum is a 
situation in which it is impossible to make 
anyone better-off without making someone 
worse-off (Varian, 1992). In the case of credit 
markets, this means that, at that ultimate stage, 
all borrowers would obtain the loan they were 
                                                          
2  Pareto optimum is called after the famous Italian 
economist Vilfredo Pareto (1848-1923).  
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looking for at a price corresponding to the 
supply/demand situation of the moment. To 
achieve such an optimum, competition must be 
allowed to drive the market, external 
interventions are not needed.  
However, credit markets diverge from an 
idealised market because of imperfect 
information in these markets (Besley, 1994). 
The specificities of credit markets have led 
economists to amend the competitive market 
paradigm. Credit markets are said to be 
structurally imperfect markets. The 
imperfection stems from the nature of the 
goods exchanged in the credit markets. Credit 
is a special good because it requires repayment 
over a longer time span. However, repayment 
is not always made by borrowers, making the 
presence of external sanctions necessary to 
enforce claims. This is why Besley suggests 
that a lender’s willingness to lend money to a 
particular borrower may hinge on having 
enough information about the borrower’s 
reliability and on being sure that borrower will 
use the borrowed funds wisely (Besley, 1994, 
p.29). In addition, suppliers and borrowers in 
these markets do not share the same 
information, which creates imbalances 
between the two types of actors.  
Besley (1994) also argues that even though 
credit markets are imperfect, they may still 
achieve a lower standard of efficiency and are 
referred to as Pareto constrained efficiency. In 
practical terms, this lower standard explains 
why the credit supply never meets all of the 
demand for credit. In other words, the presence 
of such imperfect information may explain 
why lenders choose not to serve some 
individuals. The key concepts of the imperfect 
information paradigm discussed here are 
asymmetric information, moral hazard, adverse 
selection, and credit rationing. 
Asymmetric information refers to 
situations in which one party to a transaction 
has more information about the transaction 
than the other. This situation could cause 
markets to deviate from the behaviour patterns 
conventionally and lead to moral hazard and 
adverse selection (Akerlof, 1970, Arrow, 1968, 
Hillier & Ibrahimo, 1993). Following Arrow 
(1963, 1968), Hillier and Ibrahimo (1993) 
point out that the problem of moral hazard 
occurs when one party, known as the principal, 
enters into a contract with another, known as 
the agent, who has some degree of autonomy 
over his consequent actions which cannot be 
perfectly monitored by the principal. These 
actions affect the outcome for both the 
principal and the agent and their preferences 
differ so that there is some degree of conflict 
between two parties. The principal, therefore, 
wishes to devise a contract which will include 
the agent to undertake actions, which the 
principal cannot fully monitored, desired by 
the principal. The application of this idea to the 
credit market as follows. Consider the bank to 
be the principal and the borrower to be the 
agent. If the interest rate to be charged on the 
loan affects the consequent behaviour of the 
borrower, then the bank may choose to set an 
interest rate which does not clear the credit 
market if it chooses the interest rate partly to 
influence the unobservable behaviour of the 
borrower and the use made of the loan. For 
instance, if a higher interest rate encouraged 
borrowers taking out loans for investment 
finance to invest in riskier projects it may be 
shown that banks may have an incentive to 
charge a less than market clearing rate in order 
to induce investment in less risky projects. 
The idea of adverse selection problem was 
developed by George Akerlof (1970) in his 
well-known article, “The Market for Lemons: 
Quality Uncertainty and the Market 
Mechanism,” which analyses a market for used 
cars. The adverse selection problem occurs in 
markets where products of different quality are 
sold to buyers who, because of asymmetric 
information, cannot observe the quality of the 
products they purchase. In the used car 
example of Akerlof, the sellers are 
knowledgeable about the quality of each car 
offered for sale; the buyers are not. When 
buyers cannot distinguish, within a given type 
 Jurnal Ekonomi & Bisnis Indonesia Januari 
 
26 
of used car, between good cars (high quality 
products) and those bad cars (low quality 
products) which in America are known as 
“lemons”, the sellers –who know the quality of 
each car- can offer the lemons at the same 
price as the high-quality cars. Akerlof (1970, 
p. 497-9) also points out that the adverse 
selection problem also exists in credit market 
in developing countries such as India. He 
points out that while the large banks in the 
central cities have interest rates of 6, 8, and 10 
percent, the local money-lenders charges 15, 
25, and even 50 percent in India. The answer 
to this seeming paradox is that credit is granted 
only where the granter has (1) easy means of 
enforcing his contract or (2) personal 
knowledge of the character of the borrower. 
The middleman who tries to arbitrage between 
the rates of the moneylender and the central 
bank is apt to attract all the “lemons” and 
thereby make a loss. 
As noted above, both adverse selection 
and moral hazard exist in credit markets. These 
forms of asymmetric information will lead to 
credit rationing. The following section surveys 
developments in the theory of credit markets 
focusing on the credit rationing and their 
usefulness for policy analysis. The purpose 
here is to describe some of the main ideas in 
imperfect information credit models in the 
context of microfinance institutions and their 
experiences in developing countries.  
Jaffee & Russel (1976) develop a specific 
model of how imperfect information and 
uncertainty can lead to rationing in loans 
markets. They analyse the behaviour of a loan 
market in which borrowers have more 
information about the likelihood of default 
than do lenders (Jaffee & Russel, 1976). Their 
model is a model of credit rationing with two 
types of borrowers: “honest” and “dishonest” 
(see Appendix 1). The honest borrowers accept 
only loan contracts that they expect to repay 
and, under their assumptions, they do in fact 
repay them. The honest borrowers repay their 
loans even when there is a financial incentive 
to default. The dishonest borrowers, in 
contrast, default on loans whenever the costs 
of default are sufficiently low or financially 
advantageous. Since lenders cannot distinguish 
among borrowers, it might be the best to ration 
credit in order that dishonest borrowers will 
not default even though doing so reduces the 
profitability of lending to honest borrowers. 
Therefore, the optimal credit-rationing policy 
depends on the proportion of honest borrowers 
because of the adverse selection problem. 
In their paper, Stiglitz & Weiss (1981) 
develop a model of a competitive banking 
system under the condition of asymmetric 
information (Stiglitz & Weiss, 1981). The 
banks (the lenders) are similar to Akerlof’s 
uninformed used car buyer and the lenders, 
like the car dealers, are the informed. Similar 
to the quality of used cars being unknown to 
the buyers, the quality (risk profile) of the 
borrowers – their investment choice, honesty, 
risk tolerance, capacity and willingness to 
repay the loans, and so on- is unknown to the 
banks. As a result, the banks (lenders) may 
charge higher interest rates to offset risk 
caused by asymmetric information (the 
borrower knows more about her use of the loan 
and her repayment intentions than the bank 
does). While the higher interest rates increase 
the returns to successful loans, the average 
riskiness of loan applicants may increase 
because of low-risk borrowers may choose not 
to borrow at the higher interest rates (the 
adverse selection effect of interest rates). 
Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) also point out a 
moral hazard problem. Increases in the interest 
rate, while raising the return to successful 
loans, may lead to adverse shifts in the risk 
composition of lenders’ portfolios, increasing 
the probability of default. It follows that 
increases in the interest rate may lead to a 
decrease in the expected profit to lenders. Then 
the moral hazard and adverse selection effects 
may render a market-clearing interest rate non-
optimal, leading to credit rationing. In brief, in 
this form of credit rationing the bank denies 
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credit to prospective borrowers not because of 
lack of funds but because of perceived risk 
related to asymmetric information. 
However, Bester (1985) has a different 
point of view regarding the credit rationing. He 
argues that credit rationing might not be 
necessary in equilibrium if banks can compete 
by offering contracts with different collateral 
requirements and interest rates (Bester, 1985), 
an option not considered by Stiglitz and Weiss 
(1981). Perfect self-selection is obtained when 
high-risk borrowers choose contracts with 
higher interest rates and lower collateral. This 
result assumes that borrowers (in particular, 
those with low-risk) are not constrained by the 
amount of collateral they can provide. In 1986 
Stiglitz & Weiss respond that the possibility of 
credit rationing remains under some conditions 
in real credit markets, including adverse 
selection and moral hazard (Stiglitz & Weiss, 
1986).  
Braverman & Guasch criticise Bester’s 
view on the unnecessary of credit rationing. 
They argue specifically that credit rationing 
would remain in real rural credit markets and 
there is a real constraint in the markets. The 
collected evidence indicates that securing loans 
through collateral is not often feasible in rural 
areas (Braverman & Guasch, 1986, Braverman 
& Guasch, 1989). In fact, fair amount of loans 
are supplied without any collateral to small 
farmers lacking title to their property and 
producing under tenancy arrangements. That 
clearly hampers the self-selection equilibrium, 
throwing it back to credit-rationing as 
described by Stiglitz and Weiss (1981). 
Braversman & Guasch also point out that the 
adverse selection and moral hazard problems 
seem much less severe for the microfinance 
institutions (informal or village money lenders) 
than for the commercial banks (organised 
commercial lending institutions), indicated by 
the fact that the default rate for the latter much 
higher than for the former (Braverman & 
Guasch, 1986, p.1260, Braverman & Guasch, 
1989, p.18). They argue that this condition is 
caused by information available to the 
microfinance institution is more extensive, 
more accurate, and easier to obtain than for the 
commercial banks. Herath (1996) also reveals 
that the problem of asymmetric information 
(adverse selection and moral hazard) appear to 
be less serious in rural credit markets. The 
highly localised nature of these markets and 
greater availability of information has a risk-
reducing effect (Herath, 1996, p.250). 
An article by Hoff and Stiglitz (1990) 
discusses specifically the relationship between 
imperfect information and rural credit markets. 
They point out that rural credit markets are 
based on the following three observations 
(Hoff & Stiglitz, 1990, p.237):  
1. Borrowers differ in the likelihood that they 
will default, and it is costly to determine 
the extent of that risk for each borrower. 
This is known as the screening problem;  
2. It is costly to ensure that borrowers take 
those actions which make repayment most 
likely. This is the incentives problem; and  
3. It is difficult to compel repayment. This is 
the enforcement problem. 
To solve the three problems, Hoff and 
Stiglitz (1990, p.238) suggest two types of 
mechanisms. First, indirect mechanisms rely 
on the design of contracts by lenders such that, 
when a borrower responds to these contracts in 
his own best interests, the lenders obtains 
information about the riskiness of the borrower 
and induces him to take actions to reduce the 
likelihood of default and to repay the loan 
whenever he has resources to do so. Second, 
direct mechanisms rely on lenders expending 
resources to screen applicants and enforce 
loans. It follows from this that high interest 
rates may reflect the high costs of these 
activities. Perhaps more important, however, 
these direct mechanisms (through, for instance, 
personal relationship, trade-credit linkages, 
usufruct loans) lead to a monopolistically 
competitive structure with interest rate spreads 
between different segments of rural credit 
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markets. Moreover, this suggests that the 
money lenders’ power is unlikely to be broken 
by the entry of institutional credit, unless the 
new institutions themselves find substitutes for 
the direct mechanisms used by moneylenders 
to overcome the problems of screening, 
incentives, and enforcement. 
Besley (1994) points out three features of 
rural credit markets. The first feature is scarce 
of collateral. Besley states that one solution to 
the repayment problem, as a result from moral 
hazard and adverse selection problems, is to 
have the borrower put up a physical asset that 
the lender can seize if the borrower defaults. 
However, in rural credit markets generally the 
borrowers are too poor to have assets that 
could be collateralised. The second feature is 
underdevelopment of complementary 
institutions. In rural areas of developing 
countries, poorly developed communications 
may also make the use of formal (commercial) 
bank arrangements costly for many 
individuals. In addition, complementary 
markets may be missing such as insurance 
markets that could mitigate the problems of 
income uncertainty. If individuals could ensure 
their incomes, default might be less a problem. 
Another way to mitigate default problem is to 
assemble individual credit histories and to 
sanction delinquent borrowers. Such means are 
commonplace in developed countries. 
However, they required reliable systems of 
communication among lenders that seldom 
exist in rural areas of developing countries. 
Therefore, policy interventions are needed, for 
example, through programs that raise literacy 
levels that could improve the operation of 
credit markets (Besley, 1994). 
The third feature is covariant risk and 
segmented markets. A special feature of 
agriculture is the risk of income shocks 
because of weather fluctuations as well as 
changes in commodity prices. Such shocks 
affect the operation of credit markets if they 
create a potential for a group of farmers to 
default at the same time. This risk could be 
averted if lenders held loan portfolios that were 
well diversified. However, credit markets in 
rural areas tend to be segmented. A lender’s 
portfolio of loans is concentrating on a group 
of individuals facing common shocks to their 
income, in one particular geographic area, for 
example, or on farmers producing one 
particular crop, or on one particular kinship 
group. 
In summary, the most important factors 
affecting the allocation of credit, particularly in 
rural credit markets, are: (1) lack of collateral 
on the part of the borrower since finiteness of 
borrowers’ wealth, (2) adverse selection 
problems, (3) moral hazard problems, and (4) 
insufficient number of instruments for 
screening and enforcement problems. The 
following section discusses how developing 
countries deal with these problems. 
INSTITUTIONS AND CREDIT RISK  
Douglas C. North defines institutions as 
the rules of the game in a society, or, more 
formally, the humanly devised constraints that 
structure human interaction (North, 1994, 
p.360, North, 1991, p. 97, North, 1990, p.3, 
North, 1995, p.23). In a more practical way, 
institutions can be defined as the rules or 
procedures that shape how agents (people) 
interact and the organizations that implement 
the rules and codes of conduct to achieve 
desired outcomes (Brinkerhoff & Goldsmith, 
1992, p.371, World Bank, 2002, p.6). 
Institutions include laws, formal (government) 
regulations, cultures, conventions, social 
norms, and self-imposed code of conduct. 
Thus, institutions are important because they 
provide a structure for everyday life by 
defining and limiting the set of choices of 
individuals and organizations. Accordingly, 
institutional environment is defined as the set 
of fundamental political, social, and legal 
ground rules that establishes the basis for 
production, exchange, and distribution (Davis 
& North, 1971, p.6). 
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Institutions are classified in two types 
which are formal and informal institutions 
(North, 1994, p. 360, North, 1991, p.97, North, 
1995, p.23, World Bank, 2002, p.6). Formal 
institutions include the rules written into the 
law and regulations by government, rules 
codified and adopted by private institutions, 
and public and private organizations operating 
under public law. Informal institutions, which 
often are operating outside the formal legal 
system, reflect unwritten codes of social 
conduct such as social norms and sanctions 
and using social mechanisms to assess 
creditworthiness based on the reputation of the 
agents involved. It is argued that in situations 
where formal institutions (regulations) fail, 
informal institutions will come into play to 
reduce uncertainty and provide constancy to 
individuals and organizations (Besley, 1995, 
Braverman & Guasch, 1986, Braverman & 
Guasch, 1989, North, 1990, World Bank, 
2002). On the contrary, when informal 
institutions fail, formal institutions will play 
their role (World Bank, 2002). Another 
possibility is integrating informal and formal 
institutions. The World Bank (2002) argues 
that building bridges between informal 
institutions and formal institutions is an 
effective means of enhancing the success of 
formal institutions. However, as argued by the 
World Bank (2002, p.172), building formal 
institutions that complement existing informal 
institutions needs an adequate attention paid to 
norms and culture in order to deliver desired 
outcomes. 
Institutions influence individuals’ decision 
making by signalling which choices are 
acceptable and determining which norms and 
behaviours are socialised in a given society 
(Powell & DiMaggio, 1991). Institutions also 
affect the actions of organizations by 
constraining which actions are acceptable and 
supportable within the environment (Aldrich & 
Fiol, 1994). There are many studies in the 
literature that discuss the influence of 
institutions - both formal and informal 
institutions - on the performance and 
sustainability of economic/ business entities or 
firms. The evidence strongly suggests that the 
success and sustainability of firms, including 
microfinance institutions, has been very much 
influenced by their institutional – both formal 
and informal institutions - environments 
(Baum & Oliver, 1991, Carrol, 1993, Chaves 
& Gonzales-Vega, 1996, DiMaggio & Powell, 
1983, Meyer & Rowan, 1977, Oliver, 1997, 
Rhyne & Otero, 1992, Snow, 1999).  
In one of his articles on credit market, 
Besley (1995) argues that the developing 
countries have developed non-market 
institutions (informal institutions) for coping 
with risk and providing credit (Besley, 1995). 
Besley uses the term “non-market institution” 
as a catchall for many different arrangements 
of practical microfinance such as in credit 
cooperatives, informal credit and insurance 
arrangements, and rotating savings and credit 
associations. In most cases, those institutions 
make relatively little use of formal contractual 
obligations enforced through a codified legal 
system. There can, however, be well-defined 
rules of operation among the members of 
institution, which are either embodied in a 
constitution or time-honoured tradition such as 
social norms, historical patterns, and 
management procedures (Braverman & 
Guasch, 1986). Such arrangements tend to be 
non-anonymous, with parties to any 
transaction knowing each other well. 
The informal institutions tend to exploit a 
comparative advantage in monitoring and 
enforcement capacity compare to formal 
institutions (Arnott & Stiglitz, 1990, Stiglitz, 
1990). They argue that the comparative 
advantage of informal institutions in terms of 
monitoring is that individuals who interact in a 
variety of non-market contexts tend to know 
each other well. Thus they have a greater 
ability to monitor each other than do formal 
financial institutions, such as banks. This can 
explain why many non-market institutions 
function effectively where formal institutions 
fail. 
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A more recent article (Fuentes, 1996) 
proposes microfinance institutions to utilise a 
member of rural (local) community to act as an 
agent in screening potential borrowers and 
collecting repayment. Fuentes argues that by 
incorporating village-level information on 
borrower risk characteristics, this mechanism 
helps to mitigate the information problems that 
hamper the performance of financial 
institutions when lending to low-income 
people, both in rural and urban areas (Fuentes, 
1996, p.189). In addition, by gaining access 
through the agent to village-level enforcement 
mechanisms (such as social sanctions), the 
financial institution may also mitigate some of 
the problems it faces when collecting 
repayment. 
There have been wide variations of the use 
of village agents that have been utilised in 
microfinance delivery system. Onchan (1992) 
states that in Thailand, the Bank for 
Agriculture and Agricutural Cooperatives 
(BAAC) has attempted to reduce transactions 
costs by considering using farmers leaders, that 
is, village headmen, to act as its “agents” in the 
village (Onchan, 1992, p.114-5). The Ministry 
of Finance directs BAAC to provide relatively 
large amounts of loans to groups of low-
income farmers. The credit is given to the 
groups with no collateral. In order to reduce 
transaction costs, BAAC uses farmer leaders, 
that is, village headmen, to act as its agents in 
the villages. These agents help BAAC in loan 
processing by using their knowledge of 
borrowers and they are paid for their services 
by the bank. The BAAC attempts to access the 
information about potential borrowers in the 
village through this innovation. As its loan 
agent, BAAC expects the village leader to help 
improve the loan processing procedure and the 
repayment rate. Even though the agents cannot 
be informal lenders, they usually are respected 
by farmers. Therefore, their personal contacts 
may improve the operational efficiency, 
particularly in regard to the transaction costs of 
the bank. 
Bangladesh experiences with Bangladesh 
Rural Advancement Committee’s (BRAC), 
Grameen Bank, and Proshika, have shown how 
loan facilitators or ‘brokers’ have been used to 
connect the institutions and the low-income 
clients (McGregor, 1988, p. 475-6). 
Specifically, McGregor states that the bank-
broker relationship has probably been the most 
common in Bangladesh. Donor funded and 
non-governmental development projects act as 
broker in the relationship between target 
population and the banks. There is a little or no 
direct contact between the target group and the 
banking system. Potential borrowers are 
identified by project (broker) staff, and greater 
parts of the process of arranging credit are 
taken out of the hands of both the bank and the 
target population. Activities under taken by the 
project (broker) may include: the decision as to 
who will be eligible loans, the writing out of 
loan applications, the submission of 
applications to the bank, and the collection of 
repayments.  
Many Indonesian microfinance 
institutions, such as Sub-district Credit 
Institution (Badan Kredit Kecamatan or BKK) 
of Central Java and Village Credit Institution 
(LPD) of Bali, have already incorporated 
village agents into their credit delivery systems 
(Arsyad, 2005b, Arsyad, 2005c, Arsyad, 2005, 
Chaves & Gonzales-Vega, 1996, Yaron, 1992). 
Chaves & Gonzales-Vega (1996) call this 
technique as character-based lending. They 
argue that the character-based lending is very 
advantageous and cheap technique because 
local information about borrower is a sunk 
cost, in the sense that it is an asset that does 
not have a value outside the local financial 
market and is acquired in a slow fashion, the 
only needed expense resulting from having 
been in the location for a sufficiently long 
period of time. Local agents can also acquire 
additional information at lower costs than 
outsiders (Chaves & Gonzales-Vega, 1996, 
p.70-1). Moreover, Chaves & Gonzales-Vega 
also point out that character-based lending and 
local monitoring have been comparatively 
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efficient in avoiding costly mistakes in 
assessing the probability of loan repayment.  
The comparative advantage of informal 
institutions in terms of enforcement has two 
features (Besley, 1995, p.118). Firstly is the 
scope of sanctions. In most social structures, 
mechanisms of social control already exist to 
limit antisocial behaviour. Hence, an 
individual who fails to honour an obligation 
can be punished, even if no written contract 
has been violated. Secondly is the depth of 
sanctions. In developing countries, many 
formal institutions, such as banks and 
insurance companies, are new, but there is a 
long history of cooperation in informal 
settings. This may reflect relative immobility 
that comes from regional and kinship ties. In 
regard to the sanctions, cultural norms and 
practices (non-market institution) can act as an 
enforcement mechanism, replacing external 
supervision with internal self-supervision and 
external legal sanctions such as fines with 
internal emotional sanctions such as guilt and 
shame (Casson, 1993, p.418). Arsyad (2005, 
2005b, 2005c) also points out that informal 
institutions such as social sanctions and 
cultural norms have a significant influence on 
the performance and sustainability of Village 
Credit Institutions of Bali, especially its loan 
repayment rate.  
The informal institutions, however, could 
become less effective as the number of trading 
partners of an institution grows and they 
become more socio-culturally diverse (World 
Bank, 2002, p.172). Ellickson (1991) as cited 
by Klein (2000) also points out that the social 
norms, as ‘customary law’, can be superior to 
administrative or judicial dispute resolution 
among people with close social ties (Klein, 
2000). Moreover, since informal institutions 
often function by restricting access to new 
members, they can be inaccessible for many 
market participants and may hinder 
competition in markets. Dealing with this 
potential problem, the existence of formal 
institutions supplanting community norms as 
the World Bank suggests (World Bank, 2002, 
p.177) are indispensable to prevent or 
overcome such a problem in the future, since 
the changes in the number of credit 
transactions and a more diverse socio-cultural 
aspect are inevitable as results from socio-
economic development. Building new formal 
institutions that complement existing informal 
institutions is not an easy task. When 
inadequate attention is paid to norms and 
culture, the formal institutions will not deliver 
desired outcomes. 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
One of the characteristics of rural and 
microcredit markets is the high degree of 
imperfect information, and hence a high degree 
of risk. In order to cope with the risk problem 
in providing microcredit for low income 
people, microfinance institutions in developing 
countries have employed unique and diverse 
practical arrangements that are based on 
informal institutions. Microfinance institutions 
make relatively little use of formal contractual 
obligations enforced through a codified legal 
system. But there have been well-defined rules 
of operation among the members of the 
institution, which are either embodied in a 
constitution or time-honoured tradition such as 
social norms, historical patterns, and 
management procedures.  
The informal institutions tend to exploit a 
comparative advantage in monitoring and 
enforcement capacity. The comparative 
advantage of informal institutions in terms of 
monitoring is that individuals who interact in a 
variety of non-market contexts tend to know 
each other well. Thus they may be greater 
ability to monitor each other than do formal 
financial institutions, such as banks. This can 
explain why many informal institutions 
function effectively where formal institutions 
fail. 
The informal institutions, however, could 
become less effective as the number of trading 
partners of an institution grows and they 
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become more socio-culturally diverse. Dealing 
with this potential problem, the existence of 
formal institutions supplanting community 
norms are indispensable to overcome such a 
problem in the future, since the changes in the 
number of credit transactions and a more 
diverse socio-cultural aspect are inevitable as 
results from socio-economic development.  
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APPENDIX 1 
 
The Model of Borrowing Behaviour  
A. Honest Borrowers 
Using a two-period Fisherian consumption model, Jaffee & Russel (1976) assume a large 
number of individuals who are identical in all respects and who are honest (in the sense indicated 
below). Each individual has a utility function, U [C1, C2] defined over his consumption in the two 
periods and for which we assume quasi-concavity. Each individual has an exogenous income 
stream for the two periods (Y1, Y2), which is paid at the beginning of each period. They assume for 
the moment that individuals can borrow in perfect capital markets, taking as given the one-period 
interest rate r. Loans are taken out at the beginning of the first period (to augment period-1 
consumption) and are repaid with interest at the beginning of the second period (reducing period-2 
consumption). The demand curve for loans of an individual can be determined from the solution to 
the problem: 
 
Maximize U [C1, C2] with respect to C1, C2, 
subject to C2 = Y2 – (C1 – Y1) (R). 
R is the interest rate factor, defined as R = 1 + r. 
 
The loan quantity is given in the budget constraint by (C1 – Y1), and the use of this constraint 
implies the assumed condition of honesty. 
It is useful to restate the problem with explicit notation for the loan quantity. Thus, let the 
budget constraint take the form 
C1 = L + Y1, (1) 
C2 = Y2 – LR. (2) 
where L is the loan principle. With the substitution of (1) and (2) into the utility function U [C1, 
C2], the problem can now be stated as an unconstrained maximization: 
Maximize U [L + Y1, Y2 - LR] with respect to L. 
The first-order condition for the solution is 
,01 2  RUU
dL
dU
 (3) 
where Ui is the partial derivate of U with respect to its i th argument. 
This will lead to a loan demand function of the form 
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L* = L*[R], (4) 
where, for convenience, we have suppressed the fixed values of Y1 and Y2. We assume that dL*/dR 
is negative, that L* is zero at some finite R, and that L* approaches infinity as R approaches zero.  
It is also useful to derive the iso-utility curves of the individual in (L, R) space. These are derived 
from the condition 
U [L + Y1, Y2 - LR] = K (a constant), (5) 
by varying the parameter K.  
B. Dishonest Borrowers 
Dishonest borrowers are identical to honest borrowers except that they default on their loans 
whenever their utility is increased by doing so. Jaffee 7 Russel (1976) introduce, however, two 
additional conditions that come into play when default is considered: 
(i). The observed loan demand of dishonest individuals must equal the loan demand of honest 
individuals. If this condition were not met, then lenders could distinguish honest and 
dishonest individuals. The result, of course, would be that lenders would grant no loans to the 
evidently dishonest borrowers. 
(ii). There is a cost to default that is measured by a constant Z and which is subtracted from the 
second-period income Y2 when default occurs. This penalty for default may be interpreted as 
a reduction in the earning capabilities of dishonest individuals following their revealed 
default. The dishonest individual must make a decision, operating under these constraints, 
between two possible courses of action. He will attempt to maximize the utility function 
U[C1, C2] either by the following the honest course that yields 
     C1 = Y1 + L* 
     C2 = Y2 – L*R 
or by the following the default course that yields 
    C1 = Y1 + L* 
    C2 = Y2 – Z, 
where L* is still the demand of equation (4). In both courses the C1 consumption reflects the L* 
demand by direct force of condition (i) above. The two courses thus differ only in their C2 level, 
and dishonest individuals choose default whenever Z < L*R; that is, whenever the penalty of 
default is less than the contracted repayment.
 
 
 
 
